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Abstract
The Indonesian presidential election of  2014 was possibly the most exciting, 
lively, intriguing, emotional, and brutish in the history of  presidential elections 
since reformation in 1998. This paper explores the relationship between the 
political identities of  ulama and their political views in the 2014 Indonesian 
presidential election. It  argues that their political endorsement of  presidential 
candidates is not based on interest but on their political identity. By using 
constructivist ideas about identity, ulama’s political identities are constantly 
changing and influenced by factors beyond identity. This idea also emphasizes 
that identity is created and subjective. Transformation of  the political identities 
of  ulama is a way of  showing their existence in the period since Indonesian 
independence in 1945. This paper explores how the political identities expressed 
by ulama influenced voters in the recent presidential election. How did their 
political identity affect both the kinds of  political measures they took and their 
support for one of  the president candidates? Did the ulama play a substantial 
political role in election of  President Joko Widodo, or were there other factors? 
Is their political identity the salient factor in their support for either Prabowo 
Subianto or Joko Widodo? 
[Pemilu presiden tahun 2014 memang sangat menarik, hidup, penuh emosi, 
bahkan penuh intrik, jika dibandingkan dengan sebelumnya sejak 1998. 
Paper ini meneliti hubungan politik identitas yang dibawa oleh ulama dan 
pandangan politiknya pada pemilihan presiden Indonesia tahun 2014. 
Paper ini menemukan bahwa pandangan mereka tentang calon presiden 
tidak sertamerta menyangkut kepentingan politik, tetapi lebih pada politik 
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identitas. Politik identitas para ulama terus berubah dan dipengaruhi oleh 
banyak hal di luar identitas tersebut. Ini juga menegaskan bahwa identitas 
itu ciptaan dan sekaligus subjektif. Transformasi politik identitas para 
ulama merupakan cara mereka menampakkan keberadaannya, bahkan 
sejak masa kemerdekaan 1945. Paper ini meneliti politik identitas yang 
ditampakkan para ulama yang mempengaruhi para pemilih dalam pemilu 
presiden. Bagaimana politik identitas itu berpengaruh pada politik dan pilihan 
serta dukungan presiden? Apakah ulama memainkan sesuatu dalam proses 
terpilihnya Presiden Joko Widodo, atau adakah faktor lain? Apakah hanya 
identitas yang menjadi satu-satunya faktor  untuk mendukung Prabowo 
Subianto atau Joko Widodo?]
Keywords: ulama, political identity, Indonesian presidential election.
A. Introduction
Despite involvement of  ulama in Indonesian elections since the 
first election in 1955, in 2014 ulama played a more significant role in 
the victory of  Widodo. The recent House of  Representatives election 
was disappointing since not a single Islamic party was able to reach the 
25% required to nominate a presidential candidate. They were driven 
to construct a coalition and look for other support out of  political 
circumstance, among, for instance, ulama. 
During the campaign of  early June-July 2014, the ulama declared 
their views distinctly. This was a phenomenon in election history in which 
the public could not only give their own perspective, but also perpetually 
expressed provocation, contempt, harassment, and defamation in 
particular social media. Hence, the ulama used a fatwa to attempt to gain 
the attention of  voters and alter their votes. 
Several pertinent questions arise in relation to the transformation 
of  the political identities of  ulama during the presidential election in 
2014. To address them, this paper will (1) describe the roles of  the ulama 
in presidential elections since 2004, in the period following the end of  
the authoritarian regime in 1998; (2) analyze the transformation of  their 
political identities by using a constructivist perspective seen from the 
dynamics of  their performances and gestures; (3) explain the changes in 
the political identities of  ulama as determining their political interest in 
supporting either Joko Widodo or Prabowo Subianto; (4) provide a map 
of  those ulama who supported both presidential candidates; (5) explore 
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the main factors which influenced the changes in the political identity of  
ulama; and (6) examine the behavior of  the ulama during the campaign. 
This exposition provides several hypotheses and argues that ulama have 
created their own political identity based on the notion of  constructivism 
together with evaluation of  the election result, the media, and literature 
about the political involvement of  ulama  in Indonesia. Meanwhile their 
political identities continue to change. These changes will motivate their 
political interests in the next Indonesian presidential election.
B. The Role of  Ulama in the Presidential Elections, 2004 to 2014
In the first six years after the fall of  Soeharto and in the lead up 
to the first direct election of  both the House of  Representatives and 
the President in 2004, Indonesia went through a period of  democracy. 
In fact in the period of  early independence as young nation, the state 
adopted a liberal democracy model and multiparty system.1 Democracy 
in Indonesia has a complicated history and the term democracy has 
been used to legitimize authoritarianism. When Soekarno was replaced, 
Soeharto established Pancasila as asas tunggal (the sole principal) which 
encompassed all Indonesian political life.2 Significantly, the Islamist 
parties had merged into the Party for the Development of  Indonesia 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; PPP) and lost many of  their voters from 
among the traditional muslim community.
In 1999, 20 Islamic parties contested the House of  Representatives 
election from a total of  48 parties that were able to pass the requirements. 
But a special parliamentary session in October 1999 delivered the 
presidency to Wahid and the vice presidency to Megawati, even though 
Megawati’s PDIP dramatically outperformed Wahid’s PKB party in the 
June ballot.3
In 2004, the first direct Indonesian presidential election candidates 
included several politicians, retired army generals, businessman, and 
ulama. Five candidate pairs competed to win the 5 July election. The new 
democratic tradition had just begun in the multi nation-state; meanwhile 
the state had an enhanced amount of  political and economic agendas 
during the transition.
1 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future 
Trajectory”, Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 5 (2004), pp. 669-690.
2 Ibid., p. 671.
3 Dan Slater, “The Ironies of  Instability in Indonesia”, Social Analysis, vol. 50, 
no. 1 (2006), p. 210.
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Two vice presidential candidates derived from Nadhatul Ulama 
(NU), the largest muslim organization in Indonesia. This means that 
Wiranto and Megawati chose NU leaders as their running mates based 
on the old paradigm of  elections, which assumed that leaders of  mass 
organizations could count on support based on traditional loyalties.4 
Furthermore, Salahuddin Wahid and Hasyim Muzadi were not only 
NU political leaders, both were also charismatic and popular ulama, in 
particular among NU loyalists. Nevertheless, did ulama provide support to 
the two NU presidential candidates? And if  Muhammadiyah had backed 
Amien Rais would he have become the next president? 
The political identities of  ulama were being examined and 
became more complicated in terms of  why they supported candidates 
and whether the candidates supported derived from among ulama or 
Islamist organizations. The NU ulama would have logically chosen 
candidates from NU, but on the contrary they didn’t. In the politics safari 
opportunities, Hamzah Haz also received support from NU.5 Whereas 
NU didn’t declare support for the candidates, Muhammadiyah undeniably 
supported Amien Rais to contest the presidential election. 
The second Indonesian presidential election in 2009 was 
contested by 3 candidate pairs, but none derived from Islamic parties 
and Islamic organizations causing a declining in their percentage result 
in the parliamentary election. The National Awakening Party (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa; PKB)-affiliated with NU, lost almost half  of  its 
votes compared to the election in 2004.6 This indicates that the politics of  
aliran (a term for Islamist parties) evidently failed to convince followers 
to support their own candidates.7
Meanwhile, in his political context, in order to obtain the support 
of  ulama, Jusuf  Kalla was said by the leader of  NU boarding school in 
Magelang to be a representive of  NU even though he was never really 
4 The Carter Center 2004 Indonesia Election Report (Atlanta: The Carter Carter, 
2005), p. 51, https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2161.pdf, accessed 11 May 2014. 
5 Umi Kalsum, “200 Kiai-Habib Dukung Hamzah”, detikNews, http://
news.detik.com/read/2004/05/29/164350/159079/10/200-kiai-habib-dukung-
hamzah?n992204fksberita, accessed 20 Sep 2014.
6 PKB’s share of  the vote in legislative elections in this region declined from 
36% in 1999 to 31% in 2004 and only 12% in 2009; Ignatius Kristanto, “Tembok 
Pembatas Mulai Terbelah”, Kompas (22 Jun 2009), p. 8.
7 Aurel Croissant and Beate Martín, Between Consolidation and Crisis: Elections 
and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast Asia (Leiden: Royal Netherlands Institute of  
Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, 2006), p. 140.
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actively involved in that organization but was rather a Golkar Party 
(Partai Golongan Karya) politician.8 This statement seemed to authorize 
that Jusuf  Kalla was given the blessing of  the NU ulama in the 2009 
presidential election. Ulama have rarely associated Golkar with Islam and 
most observers classify Golkar as a nationalist, secular, and pluralistic 
party, similar to the PDIP.9 In fact, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) 
won majority votes with more than 60% in 2009 presidential election. 
Asking for support from the ulama during presidential election 
campaigns became a tradition in Indonesian political culture where 
nearly 90 percent of  the population are Muslim. All in all, there are 
several conclusions that can be used as a reference in describing the 
role of  ulama. First, ulama in Indonesian society are seen as Muslim 
leaders. They are considered capable of  influencing people’s choices 
during presidential election campaigns. Second, the assessment of  ulama 
in relation to candidates has effected public opinion. In Indonesia, the 
leader is ordinarily assumed to be a perfect person from the Muslim 
perspective. Finally, the candidates not authorized by the ulama can be 
assumed to be rejected as Muslim leaders.
C. The Political Identities of  the Ulama
Muslim groups played an important role in the fall of  Soeharto, 
ending a long period of  autocratic rule, therefore providing an impetus 
for the growth of  democracy, but the rise of  political Islam has also 
worried some, for it could be incompatible with democracy.10 The 
increase in the Islamic radicalism movement might become the greatest 
challenge to democracy. Additionally, the international system has been 
constructing Islam as a global interest after Cold War. While the process 
of  democratization is difficult in Muslim countries, Indonesia presents 
a mixed picture.
During Reform Era, Indonesia has experienced three direct 
presidential elections. The Islamic parties as symbols of  political Islam 
transformed in popularity and support for them declined. On the other 
hand, in every presidential election, candidates of  all parties seek the 
8 “JK-Win Minta Dukungan Warga Ponpes di Magelang”, Kompas.com (19 May 
2009), http://lipsus.kompas.com/grammyawards/read/2009/05/19/19313579/
JK.Win.Minta.Dukungan.Warga.Ponpes.di.Magelangjk2009, accessed 5 Nov 2014.
9 Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia”, p. 674.
10 Azyumardi Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context 
(Jakarta: Solstice Publishing, 2006), p. 5.
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blessing of  the ulama. The ulama then provide the normative symbols 
message. The language which understood in vary interpretation by their 
followers.
Ulama as a part of  political Islam, are also in the process of  
transforming and changing their political identity. Political identity in 
the constructivist perspective is something that is deliberately created 
and ontologically is idealistic rather than materialist. Constructivists 
argue that material structures acquire social significance only via the 
intersubjectivity of  shared meaning structures through which they 
are mediated.11 Constructivists do not deny the phenomenal reality of  
material processes, but they suggest that one can only understand actors’ 
behavioral responses to said phenomena by reference to the shared 
meaning structures through which these processes are perceived and 
understood.12 Accordingly, the political identities of  ulama are socially 
constructed. Although Prabowo Subianto is rumored to be an ambitious 
person prone to dictatorial tendencies in running a government and 
therefore seen as a potential threat to the ideal of  democracy, how the 
ulama see him depends on their circumstances, interests and political 
identities. 
Second, constructivists posit a mutually constitutive relationship 
between agents and structures.13 Individual agents are the ultimate source 
of  the rules that constitute a social order; individuals make and alter 
structural reality.14 Agency is the perceived ability to purposefully change 
some part of  social or material reality in a creative way. Political identity 
transformation can be analyzed by finding out about the causes of  the 
behavior change. The interest of  actors is not fixed but malleable and 
ever changing. While constructivists, like other theories, differ among 
themselves, they share the common understanding that discourse shapes 
how political actors define interest and thus modify their behavior. At 
the same time, social arrangements argue the question of  who am I, 
as both logically and ontologically prior to the question of  ‘what do I 
want?’ and that agents’ identities are in turn governed by the normative 
11 Martha Finnemore, National Interest in International Society (New York : Cornell 
University Press, 1996), p. 63.
12 Ibid.
13 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of  Constructivism in International Relations 
Theory”, International Security, vol. 23, no. 1 (1998), pp. 172–3.
14 Jamie Frueh, Political Identity and Social Change: The Remaking of  the South African 
Social Order (New York: State University of  New York Press, 2003), pp. 10–1.
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and ideological structures that they inhabit.15 
Finally, behavior through constructivist eyes is seen as essentially 
norm-driven, with actor seeking to ensure a correspondence between their 
own conduct and internalized prescriptions for legitimate behavior that 
actors have derived from their identities.16 On the other hand, behavior 
defines political identity. The political identities of  ulama causes them 
to support certain candidates. 
Mutual action supports the claim that it is best to cast doubt 
on one of  the candidates to encourage voters to change their choice. 
Excessive action can be seen from some of  the scholars who firmly and 
clearly issued a fatwa against one of  the presidential candidates. In one 
national newspaper, a scholar attacked Joko Widodo saying he should 
be forbidden from becoming president.
The claims by ulama as to whether the candidates they supported 
were the best caused skepticism among voters and may have led some to 
change their choice of  candidate. Exaggerated action can be seen from 
some ulama who firmly issued a fatwa haram against Joko Widodo. As 
reported in a national newspaper, an ulama even instructed Muslims not 
to choose Joko Widodo as president.17 
A reflection of  the political identity of  the ulama during the 
presidential election in 2004 is evidenced in their demand for Joko Widodo 
to establish 1 Muharram as a national santri day if  he won. In spite of  the 
demand, there was interest in their attempt to gain symbolic recognition 
of  Islamic involvement since national independence. Nevertheless, the 
request was aimed at Joko Widodo, and not Prabowo who was financially 
stronger. This shows that political identity is something constructed not 
by materialist interests.
D. Comparing Ulama Behavior in 2014 Presidential Election
Compared to previous presidential elections, the recent presidential 
election was the most controversial. Joko Widodo’s political career rose 
quickly, from mayor of  Solo, to Jakarta governor, and eventually becoming 
15 Ibid.
16 J.P. Olsen and J.G. March, “The Institutional Dynamics of  International 
Political Order”, in International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction, 
ed. by Martin Griffiths (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 63.
17 “Alasan Forum Ulama Haramkan Memilih Jokowi-JK”, Republika Online (6 
Jan 2014), http://www.republika.co.id/berita/pemilu/hot-politic/14/07/01/n7zvp7-
alasan-forum-ulama-haramkan-memilih-jokowijk, accessed 5 Nov 2014.
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president. The other candidate, Prabowo Subianto was no less popular 
than Joko Widodo. He was formerly known as the leader of  the Special 
Forces Command (Komando Pasukan Khusus; KOMPASUS) in the 
New Order regime and is former son-in-law of  Soeharto. 
In the 2004 and 2009 election, political aliran did not run optimally, 
but in the 2014 presidential election the situation was quite different.
Megawati Soekarnoputri, Amien Rais, and Hamzah Haz were 
representative politicians in 2004 election, because they were nominated 
by a party. Amien Rais represented Muhammadiyyah or Muslim scholars, 
and Hamzah Haz represented the PPP. On the other hand, in the elections 
in 2004 and 2014, Jusuf  Kalla represented first as a businessmen, but in 
2009 election he was recommended by Golkar, and was thus deemed a 
politician. 
On assessment, the distribution of  Islamist party coalitions shows 
that not all of  the candidates’ parties were affiliated with Islamist parties. 
In the 2004 election, although Hasyim Muzadi was a figure of  the PKB, he 
also represented NU. A shift in the distribution of  Islamic party coalitions 
has just occurred in the 2014 presidential election. In fact, more Islamic 
parties joined in coalition with Prabowo Subianto than with Joko Widodo. 
In the presidential elections of  2004 and 2009, ulama support 
for the Islamist parties might be assumed as reflecting their political 
identity, providing a political agenda for the political existence of  Islam 
in Indonesia. In the 2014 presidential election, although only the PKB 
supported PDIP to support Joko Widodo as president, PKB has massive 
support from traditional NU voters. PDIP certainly expected greater 
support from the ulama of  NU to influence grassroots voters to choose 
their candidate. In fact, in the 2014 presidential election, none of  Islamist 
organizations were consistent with their choice. The ulama of  both NU 
and Muhammadiyyah also varied in expressing their political views, for 
instance, NU did not always support Joko Widodo and Muhammadiyah 
did not always support Prabowo Subianto.
E. Controversial Fatwa During Election 
The behavior of  the ulama during the presidential election was 
expressed in their statements. Many expressed their acceptance and 
rejection by issuing controversial fatwa. A fatwa is generally understood 
as an Islamic legal opinion given by an individual muftī (fatwa-giver) or 
group of  muftīs or ulama at the request of  someone, called a mustaftī 
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(fatwa seeker).18 Ulama even issued fatwas to prohibit Muslims from 
choosing a certain candidate for president or which obligated them to 
prefer another. This became worrying when ulama made efforts to bias 
voter choice, which had the potential to trigger social conflict. Ulama 
justification to both candidates may have been caused by the negative 
rumors. The fatwas elicited further debate, controversy, and revolved 
around the question of  competency, representation and claims over the 
silent majority.19 
A fatwa is reflected in the doctrine of  al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf  wa nahy ‘an 
al-munkar (command the good and forbid the evil) which also contributes 
to this matter (Quran. 3:104). This doctrine is used by ulama to justify 
their role in politics as they feel that it is their duty to guide and show 
people what is right and what is wrong in politics, a justification which 
sometimes conflicts with ethics.20
In the 2004 presidential election, several influential ulama of  NU, 
in East Java, issued a fatwa ordering members to vote against any woman 
candidate for president, and also, in February 2004, an extended plenary 
meeting or mini tanwir (the second highest assembly) of  Muhammadiyah 
in Yogyakarta also issued a fatwa that supported Amien Rais, a former 
chairman of  the Muhammadiyah, as a presidential candidate.21 Fatwas are 
usually related to civil and religious matters, hence those in the political 
sphere may trigger resistance among Muslims.
In the national Muslim newspaper, Republika, the Forum of  
Ummah Ulama Indonesia (Forum Ulama Ummat Indonesia; FUUI) 
stressed the fatwa haram (forbidding Muslims) to Muslim voters forbidding 
them to choose Joko Widodo in the 2014 presidential election. They 
claimed that the pair of  candidates (Widodo and Kalla) would provoke 
potential religious conflict. According to KH. Abdul Kareem, head of  
Az-Zayyady Boarding School, in Laweyan, Solo, who has known Joko 
Widodo since he was chairman of  the Indonesian Furniture Industry 
and Handicarft Association (Asosiasi Industri Permebelan dan Kerajinan 
18 Mun’im Sirry, “Fatwas and Their Controversy: The Case of  the Council of  
Indonesian Ulama (MUI)”, Journal of  Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 44, no. 1 (2013), p. 1.
19 Ibid.
20 Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra (eds.), Shari’a and Politics in Modern Indonesia 
(Singapore: Insitute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 170.
21 Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Political ‘Fatwa’ for Presidential Election is not 
Legally Binding”, www.thejakartapost.com (9 Sep 2014), http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2004/06/09/political-039fatwa039-presidential-election-not-legally-binding.html, 
accessed 11 May 2014.
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Indonesia; ASMINDO) in Solo however, Joko Widodo is a pious and 
polite person.22 
F. Endorsement of  Joko Widodo or Prabowo Subianto? 
The most critical moment in the election campaign was when many 
survey results proposed that Prabowo Subianto had won, however the 
situation changed hastily after Fahri Hamzah, of  the Islamist Prosperous 
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; PKS) commented that Joko 
Widodo’s agreement to declare 1 Muharram (New Year in the Muslim 
Calendar) as National Santri Day if  he won the election was an insane 
idea.23 Furthermore, it caused controversy and protest among santri and 
ulama. The reaction triggered many ulama and santri to endorse Joko 
Widodo and declare themselves anti-PKS.
It shows that the Joko Widodo votes declined in the end of  June 
but he was leading significantly by July 2014. The question is whether 
there was any relevance between the rise of  Joko Widodo’s electability 
and Fahri Hamzah’s controversial comment  on twitter on 27 June 2014. 
While it didn’t determine the choice of  many voters, it did attract reaction 
from ulama and santri. This sarcastic comment might be the reason why 
ulama supported Prabowo-Hatta.
The PDIP, which supported Joko Widodo has always been 
synonymous with abangan and secularism. This has caused the Islamist 
parties to be reluctant to cooperate with the PDIP. Abangan is often 
interpreted as the segment of  the Muslim community that does not adhere 
rigidly to Islamic rituals. Instead, the result of  a survey of  the Muslim 
community showed that Prabowo Subianto gained more support from 
Muslim voters (47.30 %) than Joko Widodo (46.39%).24
The doctrine of  some ulama who later considered voting for Jokowi 
as haram, faded away after Fahri Hamzah’s controversial comment. The 
political identity of  the ulama may not only be caused by rumors in the 
media but also their understandings of  norms. In accordance with the 
22 Irfan Nuruddin, “Jokowi di Mata Kiai Lokal”, www.nu.or.id (30 Jun 
2014), http://www.nu.or.id/a,public-m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,4-id,52963-lang,id-
t,Jokowi+di+Mata+Kiai+Lokal-.phpx, accessed 11 May 2014.
23 Muhammad Muhyddin, “Kubu Jokowi Fahri Hamzah Lukai 37 Juta Santri”, www.
tempo.co (7 Feb 2014), http://pemilu.tempo.co/read/news/2014/07/02/269589923/
Kubu-Jokowi-Fahri-Hamzah-Lukai-37-Juta-Santri, accessed 10 Oct 2014.
24 LSI (Lembaga Survei Indonesia), Kebangkitan Seminggu Terakhir Head to Head 
Jokow-JK vs Prabowo-Hatta, http://lsi.co.id/lsi/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/K Onpers-
Awal-Juli-2014Kebangkitan-Seminggu-Terakhir.pdf, accessed 10 Oct 2014.
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above themes, the political identities of  ulama are constantly changing 
and are socially constructed in Indonesian political life. 
G. Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the political identities of  ulama may seem difficult to 
separate from their interests and political agendas, for example, whether 
ulama are affiliated to an Islamic party or take a role in politics. On the 
other hand, ulama involvement in elections is necessary in maintaining 
neutrality. Unfortunately, some ulama issued fatwas forbidding members 
to choose certain candidates. 
Based on their political identities and evaluation of  their behavior 
in the media, the ulama affiliated in the presidential election misused 
religion for political purposes. However, the 2014 presidential election 
may have caused them to reconsider their political attitudes because of  
the many negative issues that came up during the campaign compared 
to in the presidential elections in 2004 and 2009. The political identities 
of  ulama are always in a process of  change and can contribute in an 
Indonesian election. Furthermore, safari tradition of  politics during 
the election given its own characteristic to the presidential election in 
Indonesia. Afterwards, the ulama support appears through a fatwa though 
if  the candidate they have supported did not win the election, the fatwa 
vanished with the issuing of  another. 
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